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This thesis aims to understand and further explain the reasons culminating in Google's 
relative failure in the Chinese search engine market. By examining Google's tenure in 
China, Google's fairings in other large East Asian markets, and other Western 
corporations' troubles adapting to the Chinese market, this paper works to exhibit the 
reasons for Google's failure in China. Many of Google's high-ranking officers have 
claimed censorship as the most important factor in forcing the industry giant to vacate 
one of the fastest growing and most populous search engine markets in the world, but this 
paper seeks to exemplify that Google's approach to China was flawed and may have 
contributed to its failure just as much as censorship. Through the utilization of papers 
detailing Google's efforts in various East Asian markets, various sources showing the 
Chinese government's works against Google and the Chinese public's perception of 
Google's actions, and works discussing Google's strategy in East Asia, the paper analyzes 
how Google was affected both by internal and external stimuli in the four areas that affect 
search engine loyalty according to various researchers: speed, comprehensiveness, ease, 
and relevance. The conclusion is that, while nothing is certain due to how interconnected 
every aspect of the question is, Google's flawed business plan for the Chinese market and 
inability to overcome the label as an overly foreign corporation ultimately concluded in 
its inability to best China's homegrown search engine, Baidu, and its decision to depart 
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AN INDUSTRY GIANT'S STRUGGLES: 
 GOOGLE'S RELATIVE FAILURE WITHIN CHINA 
Zachary Cookston 
I. Introduction  
 Contemporary China boasts the largest population of web users in the world hovering 
around 688 million citizens according to the China Internet Network Information Center's 37th 
statistical report. With 50.3% of the population connected to the internet in some fashion and 
China's internet population growing by 6.1% over the last year, China is certainly one of the 
most interesting and dynamic markets available,
1
 but due to this vast and ever-growing 
population of netizens becoming connected, the Chinese Communist Party has continuously 
implemented controls and censorship on the internet since its inception.
2
 Although censorship of 
the internet remains a valuable and well-utilized tool of the Chinese government, the restriction 
of free information and tampering with foreign internet-based firms seeking to enter China has 
alarmed some members of the international community.  
 Google was very much a late comer to the Chinese market. Although it had been founded 
in California in 1998, Google did not formally arrive in the Chinese market until 2006.
3
 Baidu 
began offering a site that heavily resembled Google's homepage in 2001, but quickly became a 
center of profit as the site was actually the first, even before Google, to allow advertisers to 
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purchase ad space giving Baidu a pay-per-click deal.
4
 Google maintained a noticeable share of 
Chinese netizens, specifically drawing about a fifth of all Chinese search engine users in 2005, 
yet this percentage continued to waver due to failed localization tactics and censorship hindering 
their service.
5
 When Google created Google.cn in 2006, their stated goal was to create a service 
uninhibited by being "inexplicably" down 10% of the time. Although Google executives knew 
that their action would draw scrutiny, they felt that censoring some information would be better 
than not offering their relatively less censored search to a fifth of the world's population.
6
 
  This position would eventually change as the company decided to leave within 2010. 
After enduring many disagreements with the Chinese government, the final straw for Google 
would come in the form of an advanced cyber-attack and further censoring of websites, such as 
Facebook and YouTube. David Drummond, senior vice president of corporate development and 
chief legal officer of Google, announced that Google would no longer be censoring and 
relocating all queries to its Hong Kong site due to cyber-attacks and censorship's incompatibility 
with Google's values.
7
 In an interview with Charlie Rose, Google CEO Eric Schmidt stated that 
Google executives had hoped for some form of change to China's censorship laws to come about 
due to their entrance into the Chinese market, but this change did not come to fruition as 
expected. While attributing the stringency of the Chinese government to the turbulence of the 
Cultural Revolution, Schmidt states that a main motivation for relocating Google to Hong Kong 
was the government's unwillingness to compromise or negotiate.
8
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 For search engines that offer various services, the Chinese government stipulates that 
companies must heavily censor results to queries that are deemed politically sensitive and must 
freely hand over information of users they possess if requested. Some members of the 
international business community postulate that these controls create an unequal playing ground 
for international companies, such as Google, that refuse to comply fully. This point has recently 
become a large part of discussion within the United States as the United States Trade 
Representative office recently listed Chinese internet censorship as an official trade barrier.
9
 In 
addition, those companies who comply with government orders seem to flourish, such as China's 
homegrown leading search engine company, Baidu. To this end, Gene Munster, a prominent 
research analyst at Piper Jaffray which deals primarily with internet research, referred to Baidu 
as a "state-sponsored monopoly."
10
  Google's published reasons for departing from the mainland 
in 2010 cite censorship and cyber-attacks as a hindrance to its ability to provide stable, high-
speed service while stating that the company no longer wanted to knowingly skew information 
through censoring search results.
11
  
 While Google currently eclipses all other competitors in the global market with 65.44% 
of the world's search engine usage,
12
 it only managed a meager 9.20% of the Chinese 
advertisement revenue in 2015.
13
 In one of the most dynamic markets of the world with huge 
potential for profit, would the world's leading search engine accept such a small portion of the 
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market for a moral stand against censorship and its unwillingness to cater to the Chinese 
government, or were other factors at play? In an analysis of brand loyalty to search engine 
corporations, Rappa, as cited by Zhao and Tse, states that search engines gain loyalty and 
approval based off of four characteristics of their service: speed, relevance, comprehensiveness, 
and freshness.
14
 These four characteristics will shed light on how both actions of the Chinese 
government and Google itself affected Google's quality of service and, by proxy, its allure 
relative to Baidu. With this in mind, the paper will examine Google and other Western 
corporations' tenure within China alongside an examination of Google's somewhat lackluster 
track record within other Asian nations' search engine markets in order to answer the following 
research questions: 
 
 How did the Chinese government's censorship and China's cultural differences 
create a business environment detrimental to Google? Are there other factors 
prevalent in Google's forays into other Asian nations that could provide an 
explanation counter to the censorship narrative and further assist in explaining 
Google's failure to corner the Chinese market?  
 I suggest that Google did indeed experience an inordinate amount of scrutiny and 
censorship from the Chinese government, but multiple flaws in Google's own grasp of East 
Asian culture and faulty business practices that fostered a view of the company as an outsider 
inferior to homegrown or more appropriately localized companies contributed heavily to its loss 
of market share in China and throughout East Asia. An analysis of censorship and Google's 
missteps in East Asia provide a more nuanced explanation for Google's departure from the 
mainland despite its stellar success in a majority of the world. 
                                                          
14






 I first provide historical and political context prior to Google's departure from the 
mainland as well as Google's present standing in China. I discuss Google's development as it 
pertains to the Chinese market, particularly in reference to censorship, its failure to localize 
properly, and its reaction to government interference. Additionally, the resources utilized for this 
portion of the paper will display deficiencies in Google's business plan. The paper will utilize 
sources on other Western corporations in China in order to show that Google's experience and 
difficulties were typical of the Western business experience and hardships faced by other tech 
giants, such as Amazon and eBay.  
 Secondly, this thesis will use established works to discover Google's standing within 
other Asian markets. Primarily, these sources will focus on Google's development in some of 
Asia's largest internet markets such as Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and South Korea, but will 
also convey the reasons for consumer habits and brand loyalty to search engines. These sources 
will supplement the paper in order to showcase that, while censorship affected Google's ability to 
corner the Chinese market, various factors, such as pride in national companies, staunch 
nationalism, and adverse feelings towards Google as a foreign corporation, played a significant 
role as well. After analyzing these sources, the paper will present Google's Asian business 
strategy, both its strengths and weaknesses, as it initially unfolded. 
 After the existing sources have been discussed, the researcher will conclude with an 
analysis of the information combined. In light of the collective research, the initial hypothesis of 
censorship playing a large role will be evaluated for validity. Next, the analysis will turn towards 
the latter of the research questions and focus upon what factors could account for Google's 





primarily consist of opinion and analysis based upon the information discovered throughout the 
process of developing the thesis.  
 
II. Immediate Context and Characterization of Who Uses Google in China 
 Google currently dominates a majority of the global search engine market.  Dealing with 
the surplus of information pouring into a fledgling internet, Google's founders created an 
algorithm ranking pages based on relevancy and popularity that, compared to other search 
engines, typically gave more accurate results. While its initial product gave more relevant 
answers and sources, Brian Wieser, an analyst at Pivotal Research Group, believes that Google's 
early dominance in ad revenue in the years following its start allowed the company to expand 
more efficiently than other companies. This bump in profit gave Google the capital necessary to 
continue to alter its algorithm in order to obtain better results. Wieser states that, " The more you 
know about what people mean when they search, the more you are able to deliver accurate 
results ... There are a lot of costs associated with that, processing, the data centers to support that. 
So there is a natural monopoly."
15
 
 In addition, Google's current dominance also has a notable relationship with Google's 
acquisitions of various services and websites paired with its emphasis on employees seeking to 
create new products. Google's "20% projects" pushes Google employees to take time equaling 
one day per week in order to branch out on original projects. These extracurricular projects have 
resulted in new applications and technology, like Google News and Google Cardboard viewers. 
The company has also worked to purchase technology giants or well-established brands, such as 
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 Altogether, Google succeeds in most markets because it possesses a 
well-established brand complete with other bought-in brands and because it delivers a fast 
product with extremely relevant results, but this is not the case in China.  
 In their analysis of why individuals create brand loyalty to search engines, Zhao and Tse 
discuss the importance of being the first to offer a consistent and dependable product. As search 
engines are rather easy to switch from one to the other, there exists no real opportunity cost for a 
user to switch from a search engine that suddenly starts displeasing them;
17
 however, this also 
means that, unless the first search engine is drastically outpaced and out-innovated by another 
search engine, the user will typically stay with their already established choice. According to the 
extension of Zhao and Tse's points, Google, once it had entered the Chinese market, had to offer 
some obvious benefits in order to surpass the locally entrenched Baidu.  
 To this point, Zhao and Tse sought to explain why Chinese users preferred the search 
engines of their choice and why some users still chose Google. They determined that Google was 
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Screenshot of Figure 3.2 in So and Westland's Red Wired: China's Internet Revolution
19
 
 The figure above, taken from So and Westland's Red Wired: China's Internet Revolution, 
helps substantiate Zhao and Tse's point. Utilizing the surveys conducted by the China Internet 
Network Information Center, So and Westland show that Google, while having a large portion of 
high-end users, steadily lost their niche within the Chinese market over 2005 to 2007. According 
to a report on the behavior of search engine users by the CNNIC conducted in 2009, this trend 
continued as Google's percentage of high-end users shrank to 22%.
20
 So and Westland's research 
confirms that Google was typically a major choice among higher educated, higher income users, 
yet adds that Baidu is superior to users with less education and income. This failure to capture a 
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20





majority of users and loss of the high-end consumers could be attributed to the statement in Zhao 
and Tse's work that a majority of Chinese internet users spend most of their online time 
searching for entertainment.
21
 Yang and Yu's work on why Chinese web users attempt to 
circumvent the Great Firewall is especially interesting in conjunction with this fact. 
Screenshot of Table 5 from Qinghua Yang and Yu Liu's Work 
22
 
 According to the table, most users who bypass the firewall from within China do so in 
order to discover information. This need to bypass the firewall can be partially attributed to 
Baidu adequately fulfilling most entertainment needs; however, the table does exemplify that the 
second largest reason for bypassing the firewall is to find some sort of entertainment, which may 
be because of a lack of Western entertainment offerings on Baidu. Knowing who the primary 
users of Google were and why they continue to use it as an outlet today is important as it 
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provides pivotal information into some benefits in comprehensiveness and relevance that Baidu 
cannot satisfy. This does show that some users are willing to sacrifice ease, and possibly speed, 
in order to get a more comprehensive search engine; however this seems to be a small minority.  
 Revisiting the information from So and Westland, it appears that, even from 2005 to 2007, 
Google's user base was drastically shrinking. In total user base, Google fell from a comfortable 
third of all users in 2005 to 14.3% two years later. Even within their strongest demographic 
(highly educated, high income users), Google's percentage of high-end users dropped 16.4% 
between 2005 and 2007.
23
 Studying the potential reasons why high-end users and users in 
general began quickly vacating the search engine becomes important in determining the overall 
validity of Google's statements on leaving China being solely a decision to cease censoring their 
material. Instead, by examining both the failures of Google to localize in East Asia and those 
failures of various Western companies, a pattern of ineptitude in appropriately dealing with 
globalization becomes apparent. 
 Robert Salomon tackles the issue of Western companies entering foreign markets 
claiming that the one "irrefutable constant is that companies struggle with globalization."
24
 His 
main belief is that, contrary to many people's opinions that globalization is creating a greater 
ease of doing international business, there still exists important and concrete factors, such as 
politics and culture, that can be attributed as the reason some companies fail overseas.
25
Salomon 
discusses Wal-Mart within China as a cautionary tale of large corporations going to China and 
not being prepared for the strict laws and completely different consumer base. In regards to the 
consumer base, Wal-Mart has largely been unable to accurately grasp the consumers' wants and 
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 So and Westland, Red Wired: China's Internet Revolution, 49. 
24
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stock the appropriate key items within each location. This extremely varied set of demands 
additionally creates difficulty for Wal-Mart to identify a core set of items that would be efficient 
to stock at every location. Secondly, much like Google's experience, Wal-Mart has had difficulty 
working with politicians of the local and national level. Salomon states that these disagreements 




 A Forbes article on the issue clarifies that Wal-Mart's Chinese locations only accounts 
for 2% of overall company revenue despite the 405 stores. The article goes on to identify Wal-
Mart's main competitor Sun-Art's reason for success as better localization strategies. One of the 
reasons listed is the Chinese consumers' preference for outdoor-style markets, which Sun-Art 
emulates efficiently.
27
 In this case, Wal-Mart's typical big-box model and Sun-Art's emulation of 
outdoor street markets and sticking to authentic products represents a separation in cultural wants 
that Salomon calls "institutional distance."
 28
 Additionally, while Google's "everyday low-prices" 
guarantee is a well-received selling point in the West, it is scrutinized in China. Chinese citizens 
equate low prices with products being cheap and unsafe.
29
 Using the Wal-Mart scenario as an 
example, institutional distance creates obstacles for foreign corporations to overcome, whether it 
is changes in preference of how to purchase items or governmental institutions providing a 
blockade to how foreign companies typically run. Applying this to Google's experience in China 
and other East Asian countries, institutional distance affects Google at every step, primarily in 
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adjusting to consumer wants and dealing with the government. While the government opposition 
in Google's case would seem to be more pressing and severe at first,  the study of Google within 
other East Asian nations will prove that not localizing to overcome these institutional factors is 
prevalent in Google's experience. 
III. Censorship Consistently Affected Google 
 China's censorship of Google ranged from direct intervention to regulations that acted as 
a deterrent to undesired actions or behavior. These regulations created a challenging business 
climate for Google as the Western executives believed their corporation and other Western 
businesses to be the main targets of the Chinese government's policies and alleged cyber-attacks. 
Various Google officials have stated through press releases, as well as personal statements, that 
the direct censorship and attacks on their personal data they experienced while located in the 
mainland was the primary impetus in the company's official decision to move to Hong Kong in 
2010.  
Google Failing to Follow Vague Requirements Harmed Their Quality of Service 
  Both prior to the opening of Google China and once they were situated in the mainland, 
Google experienced significant loss of quality in service provided due to the effects of 
censorship. One of the chief factors that directly affected Google's ability to hold the Chinese 
consumer through their typical excellence in comprehensiveness of search results was the 
vagueness of the stipulations given by the Chinese government. Because the Chinese 
government does not publish or provide any sort of explicit list of websites it expects to be 





censor any sites they think may be questionable or draw the ire of the government.
30
 They do 
offer a list of banned words or topics, but this is not  inclusive. The government also expects 
companies such as Google and Baidu to remove websites they think may fall short of Chinese 
standards or may be inappropriate.
31
 This requirement effectively puts corporations un-willing to 
work with the government at risk if they attempt to censor lightly in order to preserve the most 
unmodified information they can, which would fall in line with Google's goal when they set 
about coming to China. 
 In terms of relevance and comprehensiveness, both Baidu and Google's ranking in the 
two categories decreased compared to what their rankings may be in a society without significant 
keyword censorship. Google, to some, may have a slight edge in comprehensiveness while it was 
in mainland China and submitted itself to self-censorship due to the company's special response 
to censorship. Because Google was forced to remove listing to culturally and politically sensitive 
material, Google would broadcast a message to all users informing the user that there were 
results being withheld due to the Chinese government's stipulations of complete removal of the 
result from the search page.
32
 
  This issue would be problematic from the beginning of Google's short tenure within 
China, but would truly create pressure from the government towards the end of Google's time 
within China. As Google would get into many arguments with the Chinese government, they 
were often quick to criticize any of Google's missteps or failures to operate within the stated 
guidelines. In June 2009, Chinese officials began directly blocking certain Chinese-language 
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phrase search results as the government claimed these phrases resulted in pornographic links.
33
 
As a vigorous anti-pornography campaign had started earlier in the year, Chinese officials had 
warned Google multiple times before taking direct action.
34
 They additionally called Kai-Fu Lee, 
the founding president of Google China, along with various representatives of Google China in 
order to reiterate the government's displeasure with the failure to heed their warnings.   
 While the Google officials attempted to explain that they had no feasible method for 
controlling what the auto-complete feature suggested, the Chinese authorities were not persuaded. 
Google attempted to explain that the auto-complete feature must have been tampered with by 
users repeatedly searching the same explicit query, thus fooling the system into prompting the 
pornographic phrases and exhibiting them as more popular than they truly were. Chinese 
authorities were not phased. The government continued to block any phrase remotely connected 
to the explicit search terms and informed Google that they would be punished for the incident, as 
the Chinese government felt Google had fallen short of their expectations repeatedly.  
 Kai-Fu Lee expressed frustration with these conflicting forces. He perceived Google's 
values of "do no evil" and the Chinese government's stiff demands of censorship as incompatible. 
Henceforth, the government began their punishment by temporarily blocking Google.cn. China 
additionally used its power over the media to create a scathing report on the Western company. 
At this point, Kai-Fu Lee was informed the government had presented two large demands to 
Google: to remove the Suggest feature from Google.cn and remove all foreign websites from its 
result index.
35
 These two demands together would remove a large portion of Google's advantage 
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within China. First of all, the removal of the Suggest feature would greatly decrease the ease of 
use that Google offered to netizens. Secondly, removing all foreign websites from its search 
index would hamper some of the few competitive edges Google possessed in terms of 
comprehensiveness by offering no additional sources beyond what Baidu offered. Google could 
have resisted these terms, yet it was also unable to completely deny the requests of the Chinese 
government. If it had fully complied, the global community might have viewed Google as being 
just as culpable as other cyber corporations, such as Yahoo, in acquiescing to China's concerns, 
which would have significantly hurt its global market value. If it resisted the government, it 
would effectively shut itself out of the Chinese market until a compromise could be reached.  
 This enforced block of Google caused a huge loss of faith within the company towards 
the end of its tenure in China. On Google's website, the company has a tool that tracks the 
internet traffic from that particular country to Google products and services as a percentage of 
world-wide traffic. In order to observe the decrease in percentages as an overall trend, there are 
two graphs. The first graph exhibits the earliest data offered in Google's chart beginning in 2009 
and extends to 2015. The second shows the reduction in Google's traffic within 2010 primarily 






Google Traffic from 2009 to 2015
36
 
Google Traffic Within 2010 Beginning in March 
 While they are very different timeframes, the graphs show an underlying trend. Since the 
decision of Google to relocate to Hong Kong, there has been a sharp decrease in the amount of 
traffic to Google services within China. The first chart also indicates important moments that 
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may explain trends in the graph. The most alarming is point 3, which correlates to June 2, 2014. 
Brian Womack and Lulu Yilun Chen reported that this date corresponded with a crackdown by 
the Chinese government on Google services as the Chinese government was tightening controls 
ahead of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre.
37
 It is interesting to 
note that, after the date of June 2nd, Google's highest points barely reached 2% of all Chinese 
internet traffic.  
Google Experienced Blatant Censorship and Possible Cyber-Attacks 
 Direct censorship of Google's service preventing its service or leaving the product 
vulnerable played a critical role from the beginning of Google's entrance into the Chinese market 
as well as being the catalyst that pushed it to depart to Hong Kong. Prior to the creation of 
Google.cn in 2006, Google was still a notable contender within the Chinese market even if based 
in America, but this development of a substantial consumer base in another country would not 
last. As Andrew McLaughlin, a senior member of the policy counsel, explained in January of 
2006, Google users within China prior to the creation of Google.cn were engaged in a "struggle." 
Experiencing an inexplicable interruption of service that occurred at least 10% of the time, the 
users lost faith in the service.
38
 During this downtime, people attempting to access Google would 
find their service to be extremely sluggish, completely unable to access the Google homepage, or 
even directly rerouted to the homepage of Baidu. 
  Google could not explain to their users what the technological origin of these 
interruptions and redirections were, but as Steven Levy notes, Chinese users of Google did not 
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particularly care. Without much thought or consideration, most of the Chinese users just assumed 
that some trivial action had occurred that was keeping them from accessing Google. Some even 
rationalized that the interruption of service had occurred only because an underwater wire had 
broken somewhere
39
. Although the absurdity of a single wire break causing the downfall of an 
internet giant may strike some as ludicrous, the result is the significant point. With these brief 
interruptions, the Chinese government had swayed many individuals to switch to the local Baidu 
with minimal effort. These interruptions were what pushed Google to decide to enter the Chinese 
mainland since they believed servers inside the company following China's regulations would 
lead to an improved, uninterrupted service. 
 These hopes would soon be tempered. As soon as Google moved into China and received 
a license in December of 2005, Google's progress was immediately halted. Claiming that they 
could not distinguish whether Google itself was an information service or a news corporation, 
Chinese officials voided Google's license to operate and once again hampered their services. 
While in the West this differentiation may mostly be insignificant, it is extremely important in 
China due to the laws that forbid foreign ownership over any Chinese news corporation. This 
debate within the government over allowing Google to run or not would turn out to be a lengthy 
battle taking until June 2007 for Google to be restored its full operating license. Kai-Fu Lee 
thought of this restoration of the operating license as both a positive and negative sign. The fact 
that the government had handled the issue privately between Google and itself instead of 
publically denouncing the company signaled a sign of faith in the company. On the other hand, 
the immediate appearance of a debacle between the two reminded the corporation of the scrutiny 
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it would face. If anything were to go wrong, Google would be punished severely.
40
 In the end 
though, it would seem that the scrutiny would lead to harsh punishment and chastisement that 
would further encourage Google to leave the mainland.  
China Used Nationalist Rhetoric to Distance Citizens From Google 
 The Chinese government occasionally used the media to chastise Google for not adhering 
to its regulations, but criticism remained constant before and shortly after Google left in an 
attempt to further sway public opinion against the Western company. Using similar nationalist 
rhetoric alluding to the "century of humiliation," (1839-1949), the government sought to create a 
rift between Chinese consumers and the foreign corporation. When rumors of Google's planned 
departure began to leak, some activists, such as Xiao Qiang, predicted that many Chinese would 
be outraged; however, they were instead outraged at Google. In outrage, those siding with the 
government asked, "Does it think it is still the era of ‘Baguo lianjun’ (the Eight Nation Allied 
Army)?”
41
   
 Lei Zhang's piece answers an interesting question: why would netizens of China side with 
a government actively working to limit their freedom to information? In response, she identifies 
the Chinese government's use of heavy handed rhetoric and confirms its status as the protector of 
China having the people's best interest in mind. By referencing this historical period, the Chinese 
government provokes a strong response from the constituency as the Chinese Communist Party 
played a pivotal role in turning around the Chinese nation. The Chinese government has, for so 
long, pushed the narrative of resisting foreign powers that there exists a popular saying, dizhi 
waiqiang, that explicitly means to resist foreign powers.  By utilizing this political narrative 
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associating the foreign corporation with the imperialist powers in China's history, the 
government encourages a patriotic, nationalistic response from the citizens that further isolates 
the foreign company.  
 By examining People's Daily, China Daily, and Global Times, Lei Zhang accurately 
characterizes the Chinese government's rhetoric as heavily against Google. Two days after 
Google's announcement to depart the mainland, the government took another swipe against 
Google by claiming that all companies could do business within China as long as they were in 
accordance with the laws. People's Daily, the mouthpiece of the CCP, published an article 
stating that Google was only attempting to use the Chinese government as a scapegoat for its 
personal failure. Additionally, other sources representing the government came forward stating 
that Google was participating in "informational imperialism." The government claimed that 




 By analyzing China Daily and Xinhua News, it becomes apparent that the government 
and government-approved news agencies were in extreme opposition to Google's plan. China 
Daily's piece, "China Doesn't Need a Politicized Google," claims that Google has largely 
abandoned being a business and has become a political tool. The piece claims that Google must 
abide by the same laws in place for every business in China and, at the same time, makes a 
backhanded comment connecting Google's inability to localize to its failure to follow the laws. 
Finally, the piece makes the link that Google's primary motivation in entering the Chinese 
market in the first place was to act as a pawn of the United States.
43
 Xinhua News' piece warns 
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Google not to "politicalize" itself. The article starts by discrediting Google's claims of cyber-
attacks from the Chinese government and ends by warning Google that it will be the largest loser 
if it maintains its politicized stance.
44
 
 While not affecting Google's actual service or ability to bring their product in this case, 
the Chinese government's actions sought to separate Google from its consumer base and possible 
supporters. Although initially many would wonder why people would support their access to 
information being revoked, the use of nationalistic rhetoric and references to Chinese humiliation 
at the hands of foreign powers convinced some netizens to oppose Google and push the Western 
company out. CNN Lara Farrar quoted a user of China's Sina portal who refused to be identified 
saying, "Most Chinese think business is business, and it should not be related with politics. The 
government will try to tell people that Google is too political and wants to try to force more 
human rights or democracy issues on China. In this case, most Chinese won't like Google."
45
 In a 
NetEase chat-room, the mixed feelings over Google's departure created a vibrant discussion. 
While some lamented Google's departure as loss of competition and benefits for users, some also 
criticized the foreign corporation for attempting to tell the Chinese government how to do 
business. One user, 热门跟贴, was quite vocal on the issue saying, "谷歌只是商业企业，无权
对中国事务说三道四。能遵守中国法律，中国无任欢迎，不能遵守，请另谋高就，绝不强
留。(Google is only a company, it has no authority to criticize Chinese affairs. Those who can 
comply with Chinese Law, China welcomes, those who cannot, please go somewhere else. We 
are not forcing you to stay.)"
46
 While the message board does possess netizens upset about the 
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censorship, a noticeable portion of users seem aggravated that Google believed it could come to 
China and change how the Chinese laws work. 
 All of this outrage at a foreign corporation attempting to change Chinese laws is typical 
of the same outrage towards imperialist powers discussed in China's New Nationalism. While 
discussing the anger occurring after the Belgrade bombing, Gries discusses that Chinese identity 
itself is shaped by remembrances of China's "semi-colonial past."
47
 Gries goes on to clarify that, 
in regards to international actions, the Chinese concept of mianzi, or "extra reputation earned 
through social accomplishments" is extremely important. He claims this concept applies to 
international action and is a primary determinant in how the Chinese government responds to 
criticism.
48
 For this reason, whenever the United States is seen as being too firm or overreaching 
its boundaries, it and its citizens are characterized as bullies, who according to a writer for the 
Beijing Review "think they are the chosen people and have the right to teach others."
49
  
 In his chapter on the "century of humiliation," Gries discusses that this period of 
suffering has long been used to fit the needs of those in power. While initially the Maoist 
government attributed the pre-1949 hardships to the Qing Dynasty and Western imperialism, the 
narrative shifted slowly from a "victor" narrative to one of "victimization" at the hands of the 
West and Japan. This narrative shift results in a large amount of angst and anger towards 
Westerners as the victimization account inherently carries the implication that China's struggles 
have been caused because the West suppressed them.
50
 This view altogether culminates in the 
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opinion that, if one loses prestige in the international community (or loses face), they lose "the 
ability to pursue material goods."
51
 
 Examining Gries' work in light of the Chinese government's actions and Chinese netizens' 
reactions, one can see that Google's actions easily could be characterized as wanting to insert 
America's influence into China's authority over the internet. This point is especially true in light 
of Schmidt's statements on their initial reasons for entering the Chinese market. By clinging to 
the moral superior, Google immediately fit itself within the context of the Western "bully." This 
stereotype pushed Chinese citizens, whether they agreed with internet censorship or not, away 
from Google as it could easily be seen as purely an instrument of American imperialism. If the 
Chinese citizens supported a corporation who entered China solely attempting to spread the 
Western ideal of how to do things, the international community would perceive China as weak 
and inefficient in running its country. This result would be highly problematic as it would 
potentially hurt their ability to do business and prosper. For this reason, the outrage towards 
Google seems appropriate. If Chinese nationalistic feelings are produced from the context of a 
history of victimization, then it follows that a foreign entity attempting to chastise and correct the 
Chinese government will lose popularity. 
IV. Missteps Within Google's Business Model 
 While censorship certainly played a role in Google's inability to best Baidu in China and 
subsequent decision to leave mainland China, it does not tell the full story; once one examines 
Google's path within the mainland, it becomes clear that flaws within Google's business plan and 
an inability to adapt quickly and efficiently also provide a significant explanation for Google's 
shrinking consumer base. 
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Google Failed to Match Baidu's Ability to Innovate 
 A key challenge facing Google during its brief time in China was its inability to beat 
Baidu in the category of "freshness." This failure is most evident in the creation of the 
application that many credit to launching Baidu's success, the MP3 portal.
52
 As demonstrated 
within the previous section on what types of Chinese users prefer Baidu to Google, the 
researchers discovered that the consumer base of search engines in East Asia typically prefer to 
use search engines for entertainment related results as opposed to Western users that use search 
engines primarily for research or educational queries.
53
 For a search engine to succeed within 
China, it must use innovative ways to bring entertainment to the user. Baidu accomplished this 
first in 2002 to 2003 when they created an MP3 portal, which provided users with quick access 
to music. Baidu struck first and gained a huge share of consumers as they flocked to a search 
engine that was responsive to their needs. Baidu also made their search engine overwhelmingly 
convenient by locating everything on the same webpage.
54
  
 Baidu's creation of an MP3 portal was a huge thorn in Google's side. Baidu's MP3 portal 
was allowed to function due to China's lax copyright and intellectual property laws. Google had 
difficulty responding because violations of Western copyright laws would substantiate the 
United States government's views that Google was working with China to violate Western law, 
much like other Western corporations that had previously violated human rights law by assisting 
the Chinese government.
55
 Thus, Google was at a large disadvantage. Google did, however, work 
                                                          
52
 So and Westland, Red Wired: China's Internet Revolution, 59. 
53
 Tony D'Altorio, "The Number One Reason Why Google Failed in China... And It's a Big One," InvestmentU, 
January 28,2010,  http://www.investmentu.com/article/detail/12977/google-fails-in-china#.Vvi5d3rRZL4.  (accessed 
11/24/2015). 
54
 So and Westland, Red Wired: China's Internet Revolution, 59;70.  
55
 James S. O'Rourke IV, Brynn Harris, and Allison Oglivy, "Google in China: Government Censorship and 





to create a competitor, both satisfying the Chinese consumers' demands for a music portal while 




 Baidu later devised another new application that would further insert Baidu into the daily 
lives of the consumer. Noticing a trend in users that they wished to talk with one another whether 
it was just chatting or speaking on particular issues, Baidu responded by creating applications 
allowing straightforward communication, such as the messaging board application Tieba. This 
quickly became one of its most popular applications; in Red Wired, the author states that, close to 
the time of its creation, Tieba accounted for close to 14.5% of Baidu's total internet traffic.
57
 This 
particular aspect was hard for Google to replicate as tougher scrutiny from the United States 
towards Western corporations assisting the Chinese government in human rights violations and 
the requirement that messaging boards keep all servers located within China under the Chinese 
government's discretion prevented Google from imitating Baidu's ever popular Tieba.  
 In most aspects, Baidu managed to out-innovate Google and to more effectively respond 
to the wants and needs of the Chinese consumer. In 2008, So and Westland noted that Baidu 
managed to offer a complete 56 applications to its users seeking to insert itself into every aspect 
of the user's life, but worldwide, Google only offered 43 applications, some of which (including 
the extremely popular Gmail and blogging services) were not offered in the Chinese market due 
to the pressure from the United States government and mandates of the Chinese government that 
the location of servers for all blogging and email applications must be within the mainland. 
While censorship may have played a role in preventing Google's ability to offer some 
                                                          
56
 Jemima Kiss, "Google Ups its Chinese Game with Free Music Service," The Guardian, March 30, 2009, 
http://www.theguardian.com/media/pda/2009/mar/30/google-digital-music-and-audio (accessed 11/20/2015). 
57





applications or limit what could be created, the point remains that Baidu worked to offer more to 
the user, a large portion of which were geared towards entertainment or the lifestyle of the user.
58
 
Google's Competitive Edge in the West did not Translate Effectively in Asia 
 In the Western World, Google is synonymous with using a search engine for one reason: 
to most users, it seems to give the most relevant and accurate search results all within the 
confines of a clean and simply designed webpage. These two factors would not transfer to their 
East Asian markets. Google accomplishes providing effective and relevant results by utilizing its 
patented PageRank algorithm, which actually becomes more accurate the more sources present 
on the web.
59
 However, this innovative and highly efficient system would falter in China. The 
main aspect dealing a substantial blow to the effectiveness of Google's PageRank is the amount 
of self-censorship the Chinese government would strongly suggest search engine corporations 
place upon their results. This self-censorship was problematic due to limiting responses to search 
queries. 
 Within In the Plex, Steven Levy offers additional insight into why PageRank faltered in 
the Chinese system based on his interview with one of Google's head engineers, Jun Liu. Hired 
in 2006, Liu was immediately tasked with identifying why PageRank, a proven commodity in the 
West, was not giving the same comparative advantages. While performing a comparative study 
of Google and its competitors' results, Liu realized that Google was producing substandard 
results for all recent pop culture events or figures. The algorithm was well equipped to deal with 
familiar and well-established queries, but the system had a difficult time establishing the 
importance to be associated with new search terms. Liu states that over a year and a half and 
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around 80% of the focus during this time period was all spent recalibrating and rebuilding the 
infrastructure of the search engine code in order to more effectively handle new results. After the 
process was complete, their studies show that Google's results were far more accurate and 
relevant than Baidu's in all aspects, whether the query was new or established; however, at this 
point, it did not matter.
60
 The Chinese citizens had made up their mind. Because Baidu handled 
searches for pop culture better than Google, the Chinese public was already convinced that Baidu 
was far more attentive to their needs and, therefore, the better search engine.  
   In terms of webpage design, Google also faltered within East Asia. Attempting to keep 
their trademark stylistic page, Google tweaked their search bar to receive Chinese characters, but 
it did not go as well as initially hoped. While the plain, simple box responds well to the English 
alphabet, the search bar could not adequately display Chinese characters often leaving parts 
hidden or obscured by the search box.
61
 In response, Baidu wanted to create an easy method to 
both observe what was being searched for as well as not struggle with inputting the correct 
character or word. To do this, Baidu released a pinyin input system allowing users to type the 
pinyin of whatever phrase they wanted and the most accurate search phrase would display or 
allow users to correct the individual characters of the suggested search term.
62
  
Nationalistic Tendencies Hurt Perceptions of Google 
 A third reason for Google's inability to adapt to China's market was its difficulty in 
countering the perception amongst Chinese citizens that Google was a completely foreign 
company or hostile to China's interests due to Western ties. This perception is one that seemed to 
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stick despite the hiring of Kai-Fu Lee, an established businessman who had begun the Microsoft 
Research Lab in China, to lead the engineering operations of Google China. Baidu readily 
embraced this perception and emphasized it as part of its sales pitch how Chinese users took it as 
a point of pride to wholeheartedly support a Chinese company. In one of Baidu's popular 
commercials, Google and Baidu are depicted in a contest of wits. Google is characterized as a 
Western man with facial hair donning a top hat and western suit, while the representation of 
Baidu is clothed in bright yellow, traditional Chinese attire. Although the commercial exhibits 
Baidu as an extremely knowledgeable and fluent speaker, the man portraying Google, initially 
with a woman in a wedding dress at his side, consistently speaks as a man of low intelligence, 
butchering his pronunciation and easily being fooled into embarrassing himself by the depiction 
of Baidu. At the end of the commercial, Baidu has wooed the woman in the bride's dress away 




 This depiction of Google as an unfamiliar foreigner was one that Baidu worked to 
perpetuate and the executives of Mountain View, California, did little to counteract despite Kai-
Fu Lee consistently requesting funding for various marketing campaigns. Kai-Fu Lee believed 
that Google's inability to be viewed as the normal person's search engine, rather than only for 
those well-educated or well-versed in English,
64
 was the lack of the penetration of advertising 
that Baidu's aggressive campaigns achieved. He noted that Baidu was involved in many aspects 
of everyday life for many citizens. If they used an ATM, the user would see an advertisement for 
Baidu at the home screen. Kai-Fu Lee even notes that Baidu was willing to pay big companies 
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like the hugely popular KFC to feature Baidu advertisements on their tray papers. Kai-Fu Lee 
wanted Google China to adopt this aggressive style marketing campaign, but the home office 
never approved the funding as it was so uncharacteristic compared to Google's typical marketing 
structure within the United States. Google was also unwilling to adapt to the typical customs of 




 Google's own business practices towards its own employees worked against its public 
image in China. In terms of Google's employment standards, employees are encouraged to utilize 
a fifth of their time at work to further develop Google's source code to create further products or 
applications. These "20% projects" are important because that they constitute such a large 
portion of the worker's time, but within Google China, there was a problem. Although various 
business figures came to speak to workers encouraging them to independently work on projects 
of their own choosing without having to ask for permission, Google China's leaders did not 
entrust the code to the Google engineers.
66
 Claiming that there was fear of storing information 
within China since it would be subject to the Chinese government's demands, many executives 
claimed that the policy was not an indication of their thoughts towards the workers, but a policy 
of preserving autonomy in China; however, Alan Eustace, a Google executive overlooking 
Google China, stated that "it's not that I don't trust the Chinese engineers... It's the same 
engineers as here, who went to the same schools, but when you got to a place like China, there's 
lots of examples of companies where intellectual property has gone out the door."
67
 Eustace 
sought to dispel suspicions that Google was treating Chinese engineers as second-hand 
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employees by stating his opinion, but at the same time, he notes that, because of their location, 
he must be more careful. The growing tension within Google.cn was palpable. Chinese workers 
would not tolerate being treated as lesser employees for long. Ben Luk, a high level employee 
within Google China, claimed that, at times, the tension was so flagrant that, if Google did not 
grant access to the production code, there would be a riot.
68
  
 Additionally, differences in beliefs on how business should occur creates tension in Sino-
American business relations. Randall Stross covers this disparity within his work. By utilizing 
American firms attending the Canton Fair in the 1970s,  Stross depicts the dichotomy between 
being overly direct, which is the typical American way of business, and being overly polite when 
news may be disagreeable, which is the usual Chinese method.
69
 Tocqueville's characterization 
of Americans as "natural, frank, and open" directly applies to their demeanor in business. While 
Chinese business is concerned heavily with ceremony and formality, the "shirtsleeves," laidback 
style of American businessmen created tension as the American businessmen would often offend 
Chinese individuals by accidentally showing disrespect when they were actually just being 
overly casual.
70
 In the same way, these accidental offenses hurt Google within China. As the 
payments of "red pockets" to reporters is not a common American practice, this discrepancy 
alienated those who would be explaining Google's new applications and convincing other 
individuals to try them. Additionally, while the refusal to give the production code to the 
engineers may have seemed reasonable to the American executives in order to prevent possible 
corporate espionage, the Chinese workers received it as a gesture of great disrespect. It does, 
however, seem interesting that Stross notes that Chinese businessmen were advised to "protect 
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the country's secrets when doing business," which would make it appear as if being wary is 
understandable.
71
 Altogether, Google failed to dismiss notions of it being overly foreign. It 
alienated its own workers, who ideally would be the first to defend its business.  
V. Comparison to Similar Cases  
Google Compared to Other Western Businesses in China 
 Through the examination of China's market for online shopping, an interesting parallel 
forms showcasing Western businesses' weaknesses in strategy when entering the Chinese market. 
EBay and Amazon, much like Google, are common household names in terms of online 
shopping; however within China, Taobao is an industry giant controlling roughly 80% of the 
online sales market in China.
72
  To gain an advantage within the Chinese market, Taobao 
addressed one of the greatest wants of Chinese online consumers: ease of use. Taobao worked to 
create a function of their site indicating if sellers were online at the moment and to narrow results 
to only online sellers. In an effort to further streamline the process, Taobao provided an outlet for 
users to contact immediately online sellers through the included messaging application, 
WangWang. Through the survey within the periodical's study, this connectivity and ability to 
communicate so easily with sellers created a greater sense of trust and safeness of purchase with 
Chinese users. EBay had a potential outlet for contact, yet it was more complicated compared to 
the built-in WangWang of Taobao. For eBay users to contact sellers, they would have to check 
the profile for any additional contact information, and then users would have to download 
whatever messaging application the seller used, such as Skype or QQ. This streamlined system 
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attracted many to Taobao's increased ease as well as the ability to impulse buy since potential 
consumers could limit their results only to online sellers and immediately contact merchants. 
One interviewee in the survey responded that this level of direct communication within the 
service helps dismiss the fear of fraud often found with some merchants in the Chinese market.
73
 
According to Forbes, the Chinese public was also more accustomed to the type of direct 
purchases common on Taobao rather than the auction-style bidding wars prevalent on eBay.
74
 
Together, these points show that Chinese users preferred a simplified, efficient method of 
purchasing whatever goods they wanted free of fraud rather than participating in an auction. 
 Amazon has fared much better than eBay in China controlling around 27% of the market 
in 2013, but it still does not compare to the economic strength of Taobao.
75
 Amazon has found 
moderate success due to its easy design and guaranteed safety of purchase; however, there are a 
few reasons it has not been able to best Taobao. First, Amazon was slow to launch within China. 
Amazon began its venture into China through the purchase of a developed online-bookstore, 
Joyo, in 2004. Amazon used this as a reasonable point to continue their Western business plan of 
selling their products, like the Kindle, for little above manufacturing and distribution costs and 
making most of their profits off of markup on the actual content. In China, this business model 
was shown to be extremely inefficient as piracy plagued the content market providing users no 
reason to purchase content through Amazon when they could obtain the content for free. In 
response, Amazon had to completely change their business plan to achieve higher profit on the e-
reader with less concern of content profit. After releasing the Joyo brand and emerging as 
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Amazon.cn, Amazon had trouble securing approval for its wireless devices, which under Chinese 
regulations required approval from three separate governmental agencies.
76
   
 Many points of comparison emerge as direct parallels to Google's case. First of all, 
neither Western corporation directly adapted to the needs, wants, and fears of the market, thus 
leaving room for their competitors to capitalize upon. eBay, for instance, was unable to provide 
an integrated communications system to convince customers or users that their transactions had a 
higher rate of succeeding instead of being fraudulent. Google failed to adapt to the market in that 
Chinese consumers utilized search engines more in favor of entertainment results rather than for 
serious search queries.  Additionally, these points exhibit an inability to provide greater freshness 
in a product.  While Taobao was able to capitalize on the consumers' demands for packaged 
service, eBay only provided a space for sellers to list their contact information for other 
applications. Taobao had improved eBay's two-step process into a quick, efficient method that 
made the consumer able to shop safely on a whim.  
 In an article on Amazon's time in China, Justin Ren of Boston University addresses many 
of Western corporations' woes in China by claiming that many of the problems that plague 
Amazon are characteristic of a majority of large Western corporations in China. In his opinion, 
many Western corporations seek to enter the Chinese market with woefully insufficient 
knowledge of the business climate or particular requirements of the market different from those 
in the West. Ren compares the speed of change occurring in the automobile industry and 
electronic sector, such as e-commerce and by extension all business over the web, stating that, 
while experience in automobile production may transfer all over the globe, most businesses 
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dealing with the internet "don't really have time to understand the Chinese customer, and by the 
time they think they understand them, things have changed."
77
 Additionally, Sun Baohong, a 
professor of marketing at the Cheung Kong Graduate School of Business in Beijing, states that 
many businesses that are just copying their successful Western business strategy struggle 
because they "refuse to act fast to the changing demand of Chinese customers... [and] don't know 
how to work with the government." 
78
 
 In sum, these two comparisons indicate that the difficulties of navigating the Chinese 
market are not limited to Google. Instead, an inability or possible ignorance of the business 
customs of the Chinese market present a large stumbling block to most Western corporations 
looking to thrive in the Chinese market. Although Sun Baohong and Justin Ren underscore that 
Western companies have not had sufficient time or opportunities to become accustomed to the 
Chinese market, Kai-Fu Lee's struggle with the officials situated in Mountain View to turn 
around Google's woes provides a counter-explanation. Rather than being a case of ignorant 
foreigners not knowing the intricacies of business culture and the wants of the consumer, Kai-Fu 
Lee's experience and testimony suggests that the executives do not care enough to make all of 
the numerous, rapid changes to conquer a market as diverse and vast as the Chinese electronic 
market. Instead of aggressively adapting to the customs of business or advertisement strategy, 
Google allowed itself to lose to Baidu in the battle for users as well as passively accept the 
censorship without finding an effective path to fulfill the requirements of the Chinese 
government and needs of the netizen base.  
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Google's Success in Other East Asian Countries 
 While comparisons to other Western companies provide a picture of the business climate 
within a particular region and highlight the struggles foreign corporations may encounter in 
China, a comparison of a particular company within various countries throughout East Asia may 
further illustrate a flaw in the business plan of that company. Additionally, a look across various 
nations of the same region may potentially point out cultural obstacles that prove to be 
insurmountable for the foreign company. For this reason, I examine Google's track record in 
Japan and South Korea in order to further understand Google's struggles. 
 Japan  
 Within Japan, Yahoo has long been the dominant force. Yahoo Japan's success is starkly 
different from its American counterpart.
79
 In fact, Yahoo's holdings of Yahoo Japan stock are 
considered by some to be one of their greatest assets. Within 2015, Yahoo Japan on average 
pulled 38.9 million unique users per month, while Google in Japan typically receives 24.9 
million unique users per month.
80
 This situation is reversed in the United States and many 
European countries where Google reigns supreme with Bing as the most formidable 
competitor.
81
 Google fails to capture the Japanese market because, to many Japanese citizens, it 
is seen as less "Japanese" than Yahoo. This perception of Google as more foreign primarily 
stems from how Yahoo Japan began and created the synonymous connection between Yahoo 
Japan and being an inherently Japanese corporation.  
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 Yahoo Japan began as a joint venture between Yahoo and the Japanese corporation 
Softbank in 1996, while Google arrived in the Japanese market in 2001. Softbank, a well-
developed telecommunications company within Japan owned by Masayoshi Son, owns a 
majority of the shares in Yahoo Japan. This intrinsic connection to Softbank is invaluable to 
Yahoo Japan because it provides a large framework for Yahoo Japan to work off of, especially 
since Softbank makes Yahoo Japan the default start page for the 15 million users of its mobile 
internet service.
82
 Softbank's large and already-developed infrastructure provided Yahoo Japan a 
better starting point compared to Google Japan, which was a corporation coming into a market as 
the challenger to the developed service of Yahoo Japan. In addition, Yahoo Japan and Softbank 
have worked to completely integrate much of the users' needs into a "one-stop shop" of sorts by 
creating a portal.  
 To this extent, Yahoo Japan even powers their own search engine by paying Google to 
power it for them. Yahoo's primary addition to its search process is the emphasis of 
entertainment options towards the top or sometimes interjecting unique results;
83
 however, in 
additions to their own site, Yahoo Japan and Softbank have added various other services onto the 
initial portal, such as their own message boards, social networks, video sites, and news 
services.
84
 Masayoshi Son, considered by many to be at the forefront of the internet industry 
within Japan, drives these innovations wholeheartedly in an effort to fulfill his plan of creating 
an internet version of the giant corporate skyscrapers that tower over various Japanese cities.
85
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 Within the unique results Yahoo injects into the search engine, the article by Motoko 
Hunt exemplifies a key difference between Google Japan and Yahoo Japan. By searching for 
various keywords (headache, Hiroshima Toyo Carp the baseball team, and Okonomiyaki the 
dish), Hunt shows that, in spite of Google actually powering Yahoo Japan's search instead of 
Microsoft's search engine used by its American counterpart Yahoo Inc.,
86
 Yahoo Japan still 
receives or prioritizes unique results. These results tend to be more colorful or flashy in order to 
draw the eye as emphasized by Hunt's use of headache as the search keyword.  
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 The two screenshots exhibited show the difference in Yahoo Japan's results and Google 
Japan's results. Although Google's technology is used to power both Google Japan and Yahoo 
Japan, Yahoo Japan interjects and weighs a few results differently in order to provide more eye-
catching scenes compared to Google's web design, which seems typical of a research based 
website. Even on a topic as bland as a headache, Google's page seems stark and very bare, while 
Yahoo has various results included with bright pictures that intrigue netizens.  
 Throughout the narrative of Yahoo Japan, many parallels between its own path over 
Google in Japan and the success experienced by Baidu over Google China become apparent. 
First in their vision to consolidate all of the consumer's needs in one location, the two are 
identical. This idea of a web-portal being the main priority, rather than being solely a search 
engine,  seems pivotal to the success of the two. Both companies exhibit a strategy that seeks to 
innovate within the market and capitalize on the wants of the user by creating applications that 
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meet these needs and by seeking to combine all of the applications in one centralized web 
location. In addition to the added focus and weight of search results on entertainment, these facts 
showcase that Yahoo Japan and Baidu had a large margin of success within their relative 
countries due to the knowledge and attention paid to the demands of their markets.  
 A second similarity is the emphasis on portraying itself as the native company and 
somewhat vilifying Google and other foreign competitors as the outsiders. By forming Yahoo 
Japan as a joint venture with his already well-established Japanese corporation, Son utilized his 
reputation as a tech-guru to lend credibility to Yahoo Japan. With a well known Japanese elite 
attached to the company in such an integral way, Japanese citizens can point to Yahoo Japan as a 
corporation firmly rooted within Japan, not necessarily a completely foreign corporation. 
Additionally, by utilizing the connections gained with Softbank's internet service and various 
infrastructure, Yahoo Japan could connect with customers that view it as a further extension of 
Softbank's services rather than its own standalone product. 
 South Korea 
 Google's experience in South Korea is indicative of its struggles to claim a leading 
portion of the search engine market, but one that differs from that of its history in both China and 
Japan. Google in South Korea is eclipsed by the giant that is Naver. Naver addressed an issue 
that plagued internet users within South Korea: a dearth of South Korean websites existed. This 
problem meant that, if one lacked foreign language skills, getting results that could satisfy one's 





the issue of lack of answers, but would also encourage interaction and socialization between 
users: a question-and-answer board.
89
  
 Becoming a more notable presence in early 2000, this novel idea of a message board 
became an extremely popular web destination. In fact, the board quickly grew to receive over 
1,000 new questions a day.
90
 Additionally, the company incentivizes users to answer effectively 
by grading users who answer anywhere from "commoner" to "superhuman." This tactic is 
increasingly effective due to the ability to showcase one's prowess and wealth of knowledge. As 
Lim Wonki put it, "everyone wanted to be God in cyberspace."
91
 Naver thus urged users not only 
to find answers to the questions on their minds, but also to participate in answering other 
individuals' questions. By answering correctly, users could flaunt their knowledge and expertise 
by showcasing their status, especially those ranking as "superhuman." 
 By creating the question-and-answer board, Naver additionally made itself extremely 
exclusive and created a barrier to entry for other companies by ensuring that all the information 
and posts contained on their board were not accessible to competitors' search engine or web 
portal results. As Naver become a wealthier company, it continued this trend by buying the rights 
to various online material, such as encyclopedias or the rights to various videos, creating a need 
to use Naver to access certain material.
92
 This method could force other search engines 
attempting to compete within the region to obtain or create other exclusive material or products, 
lest there be no actual reason to use another search engine in lieu of Naver.  
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 Google has made improvements in South Korea. Google's presence within the search 
market tripled in the 2010-2013 period from 5 million in 2010 to 17.2 million in 2013. 
Additionally, Google is succeeding in a newer facet of the search engine market: the mobile 
phone search engine market. Although its share of the PC search engine market was a meager 3.5% 
during 2014, the percentage of mobile users utilizing Google gives a positive outlook. Within the 
mobile community, Google in 2014 claimed 12.5% of the mobile search engine market, which 
the author accredited to the growing number of Western phones that may have Google already as 
the home page for searches.
93
 Although the numbers are not astounding, it is something positive 
for Google, as it gives a greater foothold to rise from compared to a grim 3.5%. 
 In an article analyzing Naver's control over the South Korean market, Mandy Shin lists 
four particular reasons she believes Naver still maintains a firm grasp. First, Shin addresses the 
ability of Naver to inform users on what the most popular current trends in search are, displaying 
both the most common terms and trends that have been searched for in the past few hours. 
Secondly, Naver seamlessly integrates a social aspect into the news as it allows users to view the 
story, browse comments on the news in question, and even express whether they like or dislike 
the comments. These features add a social factor into the web portal as it incentivizes users to 
post their thoughts in hopes of garnering thousands of likes or the ability for their comment to go 
viral.  
 The third reason Shin lists is that Naver created a web-toon/web-novel interface that 
allows users to create their own works on whatever issue they would like and share them with 
the entirety of Naver. The popular comics portion can attain up to 30,000 ratings and over 10,000 
reviews within half a day; Naver will often hire the most skilled comic creator. Within the web-
novel aspect, Naver has allowed the program to monetize creating the opportunity for some users 
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to make up to 10,000 U.S. dollars a month. Finally, Shin points to the all-inclusive aspect of 
Naver's portal as a reason for its success in South Korea. When a user searches on Naver, it pulls 
results from every aspect of the site on the page, whether that be advertisements, news, blogs, the 




 In sum, Shin's analysis and the article from The Economist strengthens the idea that 
Naver's aim with their web portal is to create an all-inclusive, one-stop shop that reduces the 
need of users to utilize any other search engine or web portal. By creating answers and content 
only accessible through Naver, the company creates a huge advantage as a potential first site for 
searching or entertainment. Additionally, the use of the all-inclusive search, the user ask-and-
answer function, and the encouragement to make one's own content has been keeping users 
staying on Naver and keeping them from other sources. Even if the user only wants to potentially 
search for the answer to a simple question, the search results including all aspects of Naver's web 
portal and the addition of related keyword searches have the potential to get users spending hours 
on tangentially related topics all because of a flashy ad or interesting headline.  
 Although the cluttered aspect of Naver's search results is a detraction to some, many 
individuals maintain that Naver is the giant in South Korea simply because it understands what 
South Koreans want: more than a simple search engine. To this end, MVF Global Customer 
Acquisition as quoted by Maureen Gleeson states:  
“All of the South Korean search engines appear more like portals and the homepages have a 
combination of images and user generated content, which suggest South Koreans prefer more 
than search. It appears that in the majority of cases it is only after using user generated content 
and blogs that the user will turn to the natural search results. Internet marketers need to be 
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aware of these preferences and consider whether user generated content such as product 
reviews would be suitable for their chosen areas of internet marketing.”95 
 
 This quote exemplifies the biggest potential hurdle for Google in South Korea. Google 
excels in the United States and many Western countries because its main service that the users 
want is a functioning and well-designed search engine; however, in South Korea and many other 
countries, simply excelling at the search aspect does not always put a company at the top of the 
pile. Instead, South Koreans seem to be focused primarily on integration, ease, and interaction 
with other users. This trend seems to echo Google's struggles within China as well, because 
Baidu is superior at innovating and cementing their brand into the users' lives. Much in the same 
vein, Baidu's flashier results in combination with its higher resemblance to a web portal rather 
than simple search engine may be a larger factor than anticipated as it seems that a high number 
of East Asian users prefer interaction over bland results.  
 In response to the recently improved numbers, the South Korean startup-tech platform, 
beSUCCESS, explains Google's success to innovation and a greater wealth of sources to use 
their leading search algorithm on. Google's recent success comes from the innovation and 
improvement of applications designed to increase the ease of the user, such as improving 
Google's voice search function. Additionally, the most-striking of these developments is Google 
Now, a personal assistant application that answers the user's question through a voice interface 
even making recommendations if applicable. The author also notes that the application brings 
other relevant information to the user.
96
 This article indicates that Google may be embracing the 
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more connected aspect of a web-portal type service, yet still keeping its brand primarily 
associated with the search application. 
 Japan and South Korea's cases provide an interesting first look into Google's experience 
in other East Asian nations. Although Google experienced significant roadblocks in the form of 
censorship and governmental opposition in mainland China, this pushback is practically non-
existent in South Korea or Japan, yet its market share of East Asia is still relatively small in 
comparison to its success in Europe and North America. Google even had a harder time grasping 
the Korean market than the Chinese one, yet there existed no governmental censorship. While 
Google China's main obstacles were consumer tastes and governmental opposition, Google faced 
a very different barrier in Korea: a scarcity of sources to apply its algorithm to. Although the two 
present radically different circumstances, the one common factor in Google's shortcomings is 
Google's inability to grasp the wants of consumers in East Asia. For further insight, Taiwan and 
Hong Kong can provide additional cases to determine the shortcomings in Google's East Asian 
business plan.  
  Taiwan and Hong Kong 
 Despite a relative paucity of sources, those relating to Google's fortunes in Taiwan and 
Hong Kong present some interesting parallels that can add insight and valuable comparisons to 
the case study. At first glance, many of the sources indicate that Yahoo is winning in Hong Kong 
and Taiwan, yet according to Alexa, an analytical website that provides a ranking of the most 
popular websites by country, the 2015 statistics indicate a shift in favor of Google in Hong Kong.
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 Taiwan's page additionally reveals that Google has taken over as the dominant search engine.
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 While a scarcity of sources leaves this overtaking without full explanation, scouring 
through sources, one can find numerous opinions on why Yahoo initially was the major site in 
these regions, and these opinions echo reasons listed as for other sites dominance in East Asian 
cyberspace. In an interview by Thomas Crampton (a global news and social media specialist), 
Ivy Wong, who claims to be Yahoo Hong Kong's first employee, details the reasons she believes 
Yahoo Hong Kong has succeeded over Google Hong Kong. Yahoo in Hong Kong initially 
bested Google primarily due to its firmer grasp on fully embracing localization. In this aspect, 
Wong continues to say that Yahoo made it a top priority to hire local people, not only to gather a 
reputation as a local business, but also as a means of ensuring a connection to what the Hong 
Kong users want. Secondly, Yahoo Hong Kong developed the local version of Yahoo News 
while in partnership with "local content providers" so that they may best organize news stories 
and write their own stories based upon what the citizens of Hong Kong want to read.  
 In a more technical aspect, Yahoo Hong Kong tailored its search to be more in tune with 
local culture. To give an example, Wong discusses that, if one were to use Google back in her 
time at Yahoo to search for the term "cookies, one would get results only of the baked goods; 
however, if Yahoo were instead utilized, it would return results not only for the dessert, but also 
for the local female band of the same name. Lastly, since Crampton began the interview by 
listing more regions where Yahoo was besting Google (such as Taiwan), Wong states that she 
believes Yahoo is better than Google at providing services and localized tools, such as more 
expansive blogging or auction add-ons depending on the region's wants.
99
 Google's growing 
success may also have to do with the decision in 2010 to relocate its Chinese headquarters to 
Hong Kong. Due to Hong Kong's relaxed sanctions and  internet security controls because of the 
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one country-two systems framework, Google boost in users may be due to the fact that it can 
offer an uncensored search engine for users seeking a search engine with a Western feel.  
 Although Google may now be drawing the most visitors according to alexa.com, Yahoo 
was previously the major search engine powerhouse in Taiwan for the same reasons it had 
succeeded in other East Asian markets. In a 2011 analysis of why Yahoo was besting Google in 
some East Asian markets and specifically Taiwan, James Hill, a representative of the Institute for 
Information Industry of Taiwan, provided various reasons for Yahoo's powerful grasp of the 
market. First of all, he states that, for many Taiwanese citizens, using Yahoo was a move of habit 
rather than conscious choice due to Yahoo's acquisition of Kimo. Kimo, one of Taiwan's largest 
web portals,
100
 was acquired and incorporated with Yahoo in 2001 giving Yahoo a staggering 
lead in the region. After the acquisition, Yahoo Kimo, the combined corporation, decided to take 
Kimo's headquarters in Taipei and initially had around 180 employees.
101
 At this point, Yahoo 
integrated all Kimo emails into the Yahoo mail system, which brought over a significant portion 
of the established user base. 
 Secondly, Hill points to the better integration and superior set-up of Yahoo's shopping 
service, Yahoo! Stores, as an alluring factor for the web giant, since online shopping capabilities 
are extremely important to the Taiwanese consumer. In his third point, Hill discusses the concept 
of fengfu 丰富, or abundance, in Chinese culture and how it is translated into the demands of 
search engine users. Using a screenshot of Yahoo Taiwan's homepage, he illustrates that the 
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apparent "busyness" of the page to Western users is actually interpreted by many Taiwanese 
users as possessing more interesting and greater content.
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Screenshot of Google Taiwan's Homepage 
104
 
 From these screenshots gathered, it is quite easy to see Hill's point illustrated. Yahoo 
Taiwan offers a content-rich homepage immediately as the users receive a range of applications, 
which can include anything from local news to shopping offers. In contrast, Google's page is 
quite stark offering the main search box as the primary focus of the page in addition to their 
signature logo that may change based upon special occasion. Hill claims that these "doodles" do 
not draw in the Taiwanese users as much as the crowded homepage.
105
 He also echoes a point 
made by Wong about the Hong Kong market that Yahoo Taiwan more clearly and effectively 
localized the search engine product by taking local culture and terms into mind. Hill claims that 
Yahoo Taiwan more effectively utilized linguistic nuances varying between Taiwan and 
mainland China. 
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  For instance, he uses the example of micro-blogging. While in the mainland it is phrased 
"wēibó (微博)," micro-blogging in Taiwan is typically phrased as "wēiwǎngzhì (微网志)." 
While the difference may appear subtle to some, Hill claims this lack of localization and 
knowledge of local culture actually created a feeling of alienation for some Taiwanese users. 
This superior knowledge packaged with superior products, such as Yahoo! Knowledge that 
provides users with answers to questions, gave Yahoo the appearance of greater quality of 
product.  
 Lastly, Hill states that Yahoo's co-founder had much to do with Yahoo Taiwan's appeal 
and success within the area. Jerry Yang is a Taiwanese American, who Hill claims has a vast 
knowledge of the Chinese market.
106
 This point helps solidify the fact that many Taiwan users 
may identify with using Yahoo Taiwan as it is more of a Taiwanese tool than Google, which was 
a latecomer to the market. Additionally, Yahoo Taiwan worked to solidify this view as 
intrinsically connected to the Taiwanese public with its 2006 purchase of the extremely popular 
blogging and image publishing site, Wretch. The deal brought Wretch under the Yahoo Taiwan 
brand connecting one of the most popular sites of the late 2000s to Yahoo Taiwan.
107
 
 Hill's analysis of the Taiwanese market, while dated to 2011, gives a view into why 
Taiwan was dominated by Yahoo Taiwan. Although Google may have taken over as the most 
visited website for Hong Kong and Taiwan, these cases offer important insight as they echo 
many of the points that apply to Google's shortcomings in China, Japan, and South Korea. 
Google succeeds at providing an effective search engine; if it did not, it would not be getting 
paid to provide search results and advertisements for its competitor, Yahoo,  in some areas, such 
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as Taiwan and Hong Kong.
108
 Google's shortcomings in Hong Kong and Taiwan are primarily 
due to the company itself not accurately grasping the wants of the local consumer base or how 
best to connect with the netizens present.  
Analysis of Google's Record in Other East Asian Markets 
 Altogether, the comparisons between Google's struggles to take a majority share in the 
other East Asian markets, while not as exaggerated or worrisome for the company as their 
situation in mainland China, do expose some problems within Google's own business strategy 
without the compounding element of censorship. In reference to the four determinants listed 
previously in the paper (ease, relevance, comprehensiveness, and speed), Google within South 
Korea, Japan, Hong Kong, and Taiwan fails to create a substantial reason for it to be the greater 
choice and pull a large majority from the established search engines, especially within Japan and 
South Korea.  
 Speed seems to be relatively stable across the choices as few sources mentioned 
connectivity issues as a problem. This creates a base situation different from Google's experience 
in China as the lack of interference in speed means that the greatest determinants are the other 
categories. This point also exemplifies that censorship, as it is the chief reason for Google's lack 
of speed within mainland China, is not a necessary condition for Google to fail, yet it is possible 
to be a large factor in a user's choice to primarily use a different search engine or web portal. 
 Compared to Google in China, Google's products in other East Asian markets would 
seem to experience a boost in comprehensiveness due to a relative lightening of censorship, but 
this is not the complete story. From the analysis of Google's foreign market presence, it appears 
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that Google's lack of clear information on local culture and how to appropriately localize creates 
a barrier to comprehensiveness. Google's past inability to initially understand the nature of the 
market seems to have exacerbated the existing obstacles; this is especially evident in the case of 
South Korea. As South Korea had a known lack of South Korean web pages and search results, 
Naver's choice to create more pages through their knowledge sharing service fulfilled an 
excellent answer to the existing problem. Counter to this, Google's choice to enter the market 
without a clear plan to access Naver's immense number of pages created an inferior product. 
South Korea's Google could function and pull up the few existing South Korean pages, yet due to 
the scarcity, it rarely produced meaningful results compared to Naver.  
 Secondly, in the aspect of comprehensiveness suffering, Google's inability to accurately 
take local culture into account when searching may have played a role in turning users to other 
search engines that they felt better understood the local market. Wong's example of using a 
search engine to look up "cookies" as the girl band and the use of unfamiliar terms such as "微网
址" created a drop in comprehensiveness as users may feel discouraged that the result does not 
immediately show up. These examples also create a feeling of alienation as the user may believe 
the search engine is not appropriately suited for use by an individual of their country if the 
company cannot even acclimate to the local culture and provide relevant results to popular 
queries.  
 The two above points provide a segue into discussing Google's relevant lack of ease 
experienced in these markets as well. As the various versions of Google for these markets were 
not aptly and fully customized to take local customs and language into account, the user would 





same results a search engine more geared towards local netizens, like Naver or Yahoo in East 
Asia, could obtain with fewer terms. These other options created a more intuitive experience for 
the user with less effort required on their part to retrieve the relevant results. Relevancy as a 
whole would be quite comparable across the board unless it came to issues dealing with local 
culture or differences in slang. Additionally, relevancy may have taken a hit in South Korea due 
to the fact that there were a low amount of sources to draw from. 
 Another point that relates to Google's relative failure within these countries (although the 
evidence seems to point to Google being number one in Hong Kong and Taiwan even if only by 
a miniscule amount of visitors) is the amount of information and content that various websites 
like Naver and the versions of Yahoo would offer all within their homepage. The East Asian 
users seem to prefer more of a web portal based service rather than simply a search engine. 
Connecting this back to the four characteristics, this aspect correlates to an increase in both 
comprehensiveness and ease. By having everything from shopping to local news to current issues 
being searched about all within the homepage, these other companies seek to connect users and 
provide them with a wide variety of tools and content to choose from immediately. The vast 
offerings serve a double purpose as it can keep users on the website and keep them from using 
other websites by connecting them to issues, stories, or items in which they may be particularly 
interested. If the market prefers entertainment and shopping based content, the starkness of the 
Google homepage may easily be bested by a web portal offering tons of content all from the 
same screen.  
 In short, Google's track record in these other East Asian nations exemplifies that the 
corporate giant does stumble without governmental interference. Its own business plan and 





the entrenched corporations already succeeding in the area. By failing to address adequately the 
needs of the market, Google fails to make much headway in the East Asian markets. Users prefer 
the multiple, better-localized companies that integrate them into the community and offer a 
multitude of information and entertainment options within the same initial page. The users prefer 
the immediate convenience of various web portals compared to the starkness of Google. 
VI. Analysis of Google China and Conclusion 
 After analyzing various Western corporations in China, Google within East Asian 
markets, and most importantly, factors impeding Google's success in China, the reasons for 
Google's failure within China becomes much more apparent. Although some may claim that 
Google failed primarily due to China's censorship, the issue is not so cut-and-dry. Instead, many 
nuances come to light that offer explanations for why Google struggled to best Baidu, and 
although censorship certainly did play a substantial role in Google's failure, it was greatly 
assisted and possibly even matched by failures by Google to address the needs and wants of the 
Chinese market.  
 Without a doubt, it is impossible to fully discount censorship as negatively affecting 
Google's chances to succeed within the Chinese market, but it was not always Chinese laws and 
regulations that hampered Google. The Chinese government's strict laws on the location of 
servers forced Google into a tight spot as it decided it could not place servers into the mainland 
lest it be forced to hand over all records the government requested. After the U.S. government 
made its stance known on Western companies turning over Chinese dissidents' information, 





appropriate servers, not to offer mailing or blogging services. Additionally, the United States' 
copyright laws bound Google to laws that Baidu did not have to follow.  
 Regarding the above facts, Google's identity as a Western corporation hindered its ability 
to offer various services inherent to the evolving World Wide Web. As blogging, mail, and 
online music became extremely popular, Baidu's comprehensiveness and ease of use skyrocketed 
while Google seemed to offer less and less to the Chinese public. Obviously, the direct downtime 
as a result of tampering by the Chinese government affected speed and forced censorship 
affected comprehensiveness of the results, yet it was Google's identity as a Western corporation 
and the pressure placed on it by the United States' government that actually forced it to take the 
hit to comprehensiveness and user friendliness. Baidu could produce similar search results while 
providing a multitude of connected tools and services. Google's advantage was a greater 
connection to Western information and a notice that some information was being withheld from 
the results. 
 Although Google was held back due to attempting to appease the Chinese government 
and attempting not to anger the U.S. government, the issue still stands that Baidu was more 
innovative than Google. Earlier in the paper, the figure 56 applications is used to describe the 
offerings of Baidu while in the same year Google offered only 43, some of which were not 
available to the average Chinese user. Google's failure to innovate cannot be explained solely by 
the stipulations of the American and Chinese governments; it is an issue that has been shown to 
plague it in various East Asian markets. Google simply does not understand the market of some 
nations as deeply as other corporations at times, and because of this lack of understanding, other 
companies succeed in its wake, offering far more comprehensiveness, ease, and relevancy to the 





business plans. Localized East Asian firms appeared to do better because they have a firmer 
grasp on what the local citizens want in terms of applications and tools. These local firms also 
integrate methods or customs into their services that closer mimic the business practices or local 
behavior, such as the case in Taobao.  
 Google was inhibited by censorship. Unexplainable downtime and fighting with the 
Chinese government cast a shadow on the corporation and led many to view the company as a 
Western company coming to China to run a business the Western way and expect things to bend 
to its will. Google coming to the market before realizing that Chinese citizens primarily use the 
internet for entertainment-related issues without drastically changing its business plan exhibits a 
lack of research into the market on Google's account. Google's inability to adapt properly to the 
market and efficiently localize exacerbated the disadvantage already present due to inexplicable 
downtime and governmental interference. 
 Additionally, this ignorance of the market's wants and needs, whether accidental or just 
due to not caring to research the market, did little to stifle the growing resentment of Google as a 
foreign corporation that could not adequately address Chinese netizens' online needs. Google's 
own actions to not trust the engineers with the source code for the company-mandated extra 
projects alienated workers and created internal tension. By estranging workers and angering the 
government, Google did little to win supporters and allies. Baidu, on the other hand, capitalized 
on the situation working well with the government and even running advertisements depicting 
Google as a Western corporation out of touch with Chinese society. In this way, Google both 
lagged behind in most of the four determinants of search engine loyalty and fell prey to socio-






 Throughout this project, censorship did play an important role within the Google's 
relative failure within Baidu, yet it was not the sole cause as some would like to portray. Instead, 
through the analysis of its tenure in China, Google's tenure in other East Asian markets, and 
through various other Western companies' experiences in China, the reader can see that there 
does exist an inherent flaw in Google's business model for China. An inherent disconnect seems 
to have existed that kept the technology giant from having the same success it experiences in 
many of the world's largest internet markets. A fundamental disconnect exists in Google's 
strategy that seems to believe all users, regardless of market, use the internet as a primary means 
of research and information-seeking, yet it appears to be different in East Asian markets. These 
markets prefer the multitude of bells-and-whistles offered by companies such as Baidu, Naver, 
and Yahoo in East Asia. 
 Mistakes could have occurred in this paper due to the inability to properly gather sources 
accurately exhibiting the political and cultural climate of the internet market in East Asia, 
particularly China, yet the paper does offer a sound comprehensive view of the multitude of 
factors that affected Google's success within mainland China. Google's inability to out-innovate 
and out-localize the competition left Baidu with a superior sense of comprehensiveness and ease 
for the user while also creating applications that could capitalize on consumers' desire for 
entertainment. Various missteps by Google and conflicts with the government created a 
distancing by some users as the government utilized nationalistic pride to support domestic 
companies. All in all, while an extremely effective and ferocious competitor in the West, 
Google's failure in China seems to be indicative of reasons both in their control and outside of it. 





Google's inability to realize the trends of the market intensified the gap leaving Baidu firmly in 
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